I solve a first-price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object. I show that in any equilibrium, the expected utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique. If budgets are sufficiently low, the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium. For sufficiently high budgets, mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise. A less restrictive budget distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off. If the budget distribution of a bidder is dominated by the budget distribution of his opponent in the reverse-hazardrate order, the weaker bidder will bid more aggressively than his stronger opponent. In contrast to existing results for symmetric budget distributions, with asymmetric budget distributions, a second-price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a first-price auction. Under an additional assumption, I derive the unique equilibrium utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an all-pay auction.
Introduction
Auctions are a widely used method of allocating objects, property rights and procurement contracts. If bidders in an auction are budget constrained, this will influence their bidding strategies, breaks the revenue equivalence of standard auctions, and lowers revenues. Budget constraints can arise due to credit limits and imperfect capital markets, such that bidders' willingness to pay might exceed their ability to pay.
The existing research on standard auctions with budget constrained bidders concentrates on identical budget distributions. Yet, there are scenarios where bidders have asymmetric budget distributions. In a narrow market with a few major players, e.g., a telecommunications sector, bidders hold noisy information about the other bidders and their budgets. This information might stem from previous interactions or from publicly available information, such as annual budget reports. Moreover, the auctioneer can contribute to this asymmetry by revealing the identities of the participants before the auction via a participation register.
In the spectrum auction of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 30 bidders registered for the auction (Salant, 1997) . Assessing the budget constraint of rival bidders was a major part of the preparation before the auction (Salant, 1997) . GTE was one of the largest telecommunication firms in the U.S. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that the expectations of GTE about the budget of a smaller bidder, such as Poka Lambro, differed from the expectation of the smaller bidder about the resources of GTE.
The contribution of this paper is to solve the first-price auction for bidders with asymmetric budget distributions. I develop a solution technique that builds on an indirect utility approach by Che and Gale (1996) . I provide a closed-form expression for the expected utilities and bid distributions of the bidders, which are unique in any equilibrium.
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In my model, two bidders are competing for one object in a first-price auction. Their valuations are common knowledge and might differ. Each bidder has a private budget constraint that is drawn independently from a bidder-specific distribution. Budget constraints are hard, that is, no bidder can bid above his budget.
2 First, budget constraints directly limit the ability to bid. Second, budgets have an indirect strategic effect: if the opponent is budget constrained, the necessary bid to outbid him might be lower than without a budget. Then, the constrained bidder anticipates this inference of his opponent and incorporates this into his bidding strategy, and so forth. The extent of these strategic effects varies with the asymmetry in budget distributions. Che and Gale (1996) solve the first-price auction for bidders with identical budget distributions and the same common value for the object. Equilibrium utility in their model always equals some exogenous lower bound on utility. This lower bound is the highest utility a bidder can achieve if his opponent always bids his entire budget and, thus, minimizes the probability of his opponent winning at any bid. They restrict attention to monotonic bidding strategies and symmetric equilibria, hence, mass points cannot arise in their setup.
In my model, I allow for asymmetric budget distributions and different values. I do not restrict attention to symmetric or monotonic equilibria. I determine the relationship between a lower bound utility and the actual equilibrium utility. This relationship is not an equality as in the symmetric setup in Che and Gale (1996) . My approach rules out candidate equilibria utilities, until exactly one candidate utility is left.
Mass points arise in equilibrium. Bidders who would like to deviate and bid at the mass point or slightly above to increase their winning probability cannot afford such deviations due to their budget constraints. I show that each bidder places at most one mass point.
If the reverse hazard rate of both bidders is above a threshold, bidders bid the entire budget in any equilibrium. Then, equilibrium utility equals the lower bound utility, and bidding the entire budget on this interval constitutes a fix point.
If one reverse hazard rate drops below the threshold, equilibrium utilities either jump up due to a mass point of the opponent, or are constant on some indifference regions. In indifference regions, the opponent uses a bid distributions that makes a bidder indifferent between any bid in this interval. Equilibrium utilities can strictly exceed their lower bound.
I show that asymmetric budget distributions break the revenue dominance of the firstprice auction over the second-price auction. For the special case of reverse hazard rate dominance in budget distributions, a weak bidder bids more aggressively than a strong bidder. This is in line with the literature on asymmetrically distributed valuations (Maskin and Riley, 2000) , where the weaker bidder (with regards to the valuation distribution) bids more aggressively. Similarly, if budget distributions are identical, but one bidder values the object more, he bids more aggressively.
I find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a bidder to derive a higher utility than his opponent at every budget realization. I show that a first-price auction might allocate the object inefficiently, even if the bidder with the highest value for the object has also a higher budget realization than his opponent. Finally, I apply my technique to derive a closed-form equilibrium for an all-pay auction.
Related Literature: Che and Gale (1996 , 1998 are amongst the first to analyze auctions with budget constrained bidders. In their seminal contributions, they derive the equilibrium for auctions with budget constraints and show that revenue equivalence no longer holds when bidders are symmetrically budget constrained. Research on budget constraints in standard 1-object auctions (see, e.g., Gale, 1996, 1998; Kotowski, 2018; Kotowski and Li, 2014) considers symmetric budget distributions. However, literature on asymmetrically budget constrained bidders is scarce. Malakhov and Vohra (2008) derived the optimal auction with two bidders, where only one bidder is constrained and his identity is common knowledge. Some literature on multiple object auctions (see, e.g., Benoît and Krishna, 2001; Dobzinski et al., 2012) considers asymmetric budgets, however, it relies upon common knowledge of budget realizations. In this work, I merge the assumption of asymmetric budgets into a framework that allows for private budget realization.
The previous work that is closest to my framework is Che and Gale (1996) . They considered many bidders with an identical commonly known valuation for the object. Budget realizations of the bidders in Che and Gale (1996) are private and independent draws from the same distribution. My model generalizes their model in two directions: first, in my model, budgets are drawn from asymmetric distributions. Second, the valuations for the object may differ between bidders. This allows me to capture the effect of valuation heterogeneity on the bidding strategies. In contrast to Che and Gale (1996) , I do not restrict attention to symmetric and monotonic equilibria, but I impose log-concavity on the budget distribution and consider two bidders. I show in Section 4.1 that there exist no other asymmetric equilibrium utilities and bid distributions, aside from the symmetric equilibrium utility that Che and Gale (1996) found.
The analysis of this paper relates to asymmetric auctions, in which the valuations of bidders are drawn from non-identical distributions, and bidders do not have budget constraints (see the seminal contribution of Maskin and Riley, 2000) . Analytical solutions exist for only a few particular distributions, e.g., Maskin and Riley (2000) and Kaplan and Zamir (2012) for uniform distributions, and Plum (1992) and Cheng (2006) for power distributions. Asymmetric auctions have been approached by perturbation analysis (see, e.g., Fibich and Gavious, 2003; Fibich et al., 2004; Lebrun, 2009) . Nevertheless, even for two bidders with asymmetrically drawn valuations from the same support, no general closed-form solution is known. The first-price and second-price auctions no longer yield the same revenue under asymmetric value distributions, with the revenue ranking depending on the asymmetry of the value distributions (Maskin and Riley, 2000; Cantillon, 2008; Gavious and Minchuk, 2014) .
If bidders are asymmetric not in valuations but in budgets, my results apply. In contrast to the literature on asymmetry in valuations, a closed-form solution exists for asymmetric budget distributions. Revenue can therefore be easily computed. A unique equilibrium utility and bid distribution exist under mild regularity conditions. This holds for all log-concave budget distribution functions with the same support, without assuming any stochastic dominance order.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The characterization of the equilibrium in a first-price auction follows in Section 3, using a lower bound on the utility (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2, I determine a unique equilibrium utility by deriving four core lemmas. Section 3.3 establishes the uniqueness of the bid distributions, and Section 3.4 the existence of an equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the implications for symmetric bidders, bidding aggression, welfare, and efficiency. In Section 5, I extend my results to compare the revenue in a first-price and a second-price auction, analyze information disclosure about budget types, and solve an all-pay auction. I conclude in Section 6. All omitted proofs are in the Appendix.
Model
An auctioneer (she) sells one object with zero value for her in a first-price auction (FPA). She employs an equal tie-breaking rule and no reserve price. There are 2 risk-neutral bidders, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Bidder i has a valuation v i for the object. The valuation tuple {v 1 , v 2 } is common knowledge for the bidders.
Each bidder (he) has a private budget w i , which is drawn independently from a distribution with a continuous and differentiable cumulative distribution function F i (w) and probability density function f i (w). Both distribution functions {F i (w)} i=1,2 have common support [w, w] , are atom-less, are common knowledge, and have full support. Both bidders are budget constrained with non-zero probability, min{v 1 , v 2 } > w.
3 Assumption 1. F 1 (w) and F 2 (w) satisfy log-concavity on (w, w).
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Due to Assumption 1, the reverse hazard rates (RHRs)
are decreasing in w. The bidding strategy of bidder i maps his budget realization w into a distribution over feasible bids [0, w] . Let b i be a random variable denoting the placed bid of bidder i. Let In the above example, bidder 1 is stronger than bidder 2 in the sense of first oder stochastic dominance (FOSD). I use this example in the following to depict my solution technique.
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Equilibrium of the First Price Auction
Let G i (x) = Pr(b i ≤ x) be the cumulative distribution function of bidder i's bid, that is, the probability of bidder i bidding below or equal to x. A feasibility constraint holds as a necessity of the hard budget constraints:
Every bidder with a budget below x bids weakly below x. Moreover, a bidder with a budget strictly above x might shade his bid down below x, yielding the weak inequality in the feasibility constraint in Equation 1. If bidders always bid their entire budget for any budget realization, the above feasibility constraint holds with equality at every x.
The expected utility of bidder i with a budget w, given bidder j's bid distribution, is
The second summand accounts for the equal tie-breaking rule. In my model, equilibrium strategies may contain mass points and the probability of a tie is therefore non-negligible. Due to the individual (potentially slack) budget constraints, and the discontinuities in the objective function in Equation 2 induced by atoms in the bid distributions, a classic differentiation approach with invertible bidding functions is not possible. I solve this problem via an indirect utility approach, using a lower bound on the equilibrium utility.
In the following, I derive a uniqueness result for the equilibrium utilities U 1 and U 2 and the bid distributions G 1 and G 2 . An existence result follows in Section 4, where I show that there always exist an equilibrium in weakly monotonic pure strategies.
Lower Bound
Consider the lowest feasible bound on the equilibrium utility of bidder i with budget w, called the lower bound utility U i (w). This lower bound utility is achieved if the opponent j always plays the following naive strategy: bidding his entire budget and, hence, minimizing the winning probability of bidder i at any bid. Under this naive strategy of bidder j, bidder i's bid b i wins with a probability G j (b i ) = F j (b i ). Any bid placed by i wins with a weakly lower probability under the naive strategy than under any other feasible strategy for j.
Next, I characterize the properties of the lower bound
. Subsequently, I derive the equilibrium utility U i (w) from the lower bound utility U i (w). Lemma 1. Let bidder j bid his entire budget, and F j be log-concave. Then, the unique best response bid for bidder i with budget w is arg max Bid m i is the unconstrained best response of bidder i to a naive opponent bidding G j = F j . Either bidder i can afford to bid m i (w ≥ m i ), or he bids his entire budget to bid as close as possible to m i (b i (w) = w if w < m i ). The resulting lower bound utility is
The marginal utility of an increase in bid b i is non-negative if the gain in the probability of winning offsets the higher payment in case of a win. This occurs if and only if
where the RHR
is monotonically decreasing by log-concavity, and the right hand side is strictly increasing in b i . Inequality 5 holds with strict inequality for b i < m i , with equality for b i = m i , and does not hold for b i > m i . Any bid above m i yields a strictly lower payoff than bidding m i for bidder i. The unconstrained best response m i to a naive strategy opponent is increasing in (and always below) v i . If the value of the object is sufficiently high, bidding the entire budget may be the best response for every budget realization.
In what follows, I assume without loss of generality that m 1 ≤ m 2 . 7 Both lower bounds are strictly increasing for w < m 1 . Figure 1 shows the lower bound utilities for Example 1 with v = 1. U 1 (w) is strictly increasing for w < m 1 = 1 2
, and constant for higher budget realizations. U 2 (w) is strictly increasing for w < m 2 = The lower bound utility U i (w) is a generalization of the lower bound expression in Che and Gale (1996) . In contrast to their model, I allow for asymmetric budget distributions and different valuations, and impose the assumption of log-concavity on F 1 and F 2 . They show that in the class of symmetric and monotonic equilibria, the lower bound binds, i.e.,
8 For asymmetric bidders and valuations, I show that the lower bound does not generically bind and mass points may arise in equilibrium. I differentiate between two cases:
Note the parallel to Bertrand competition with unconstrained bidders. If both bidders have unlimited budget and v i > v j , bidder i wins by bidding v j and his opponent j randomizes in some non-empty interval below v j in the equilibrium in undominated strategies (Blume, 2003) . 10 The payoff of bidder i is (v i − v j ), and bidder j has zero payoff. The difference in payoffs is the right-hand side of (C1) and (C2). U i (m i ) is the utility of an unconstrained bidder i (being able to afford the best response bid m i ) from bidding against a naive opponent who bids his entire budget. The left-hand side of (C1) and (C2) is the difference in utilities from bidding against a naive constrained opponent. The two cases compare the net gain in utility: who gains more from bidding against a naive constrained opponent instead of an unconstrained opponent? This gain is higher for bidder 1 in (C1) and strictly higher for bidder 2 in (C2).
Equilibrium Utility
In the following, I derive four properties that any equilibrium satisfies. Together, these properties rule out all but a single candidate for the shape of the equilibrium utility.
Consider any given candidate equilibrium utility U i . Bidding strategies may sometimes be inferred from the properties of U i , as the next lemma shows. Lemma 2. Let U i (w) be strictly increasing on some open interval (w , w ). Then, bidder i with any budget realization w ∈ (w , w ) always bids his entire budget, and
This has been noted by Che and Gale (1996) .
11 For completeness, I include the proof in the appendix. The same (feasible) bid b i always yields the same utility to bidder i, irrespective of his budget realization:
. This is because the valuation v i and winning probability of bidder i do not depend on his budget. If bidder i achieves a strictly higher utility with a higher budget than a lower budget, then those bids placed with the higher budget must be unaffordable for him with a lower budget. Hence, if U i is strictly increasing in bidder i's budget, bidder i bids his their entire budget: this is the only bid which cannot be mimicked by any lower budget type.
The following lemma shows that whenever the utility is strictly increasing, the lower bound utility binds.
i within this interval who always bids his entire budget. Either the opponent j would not want to bid within this interval at all (e.g., if the interval is above m j ), or he would also want to exhaust his entire budget. The former leads to a contradiction, as bidder i would never want to be the only one bidding in an open interval. The latter leads to a scenario in which both bidders bid their entire budget, and by definition receive nothing more than their lower bound utility.
Put differently, for U i to rise strictly above the lower bound, the bid distribution of the opponent must contain mass points. A smooth increase of U i over an open interval is impossible according to Lemma 3, and the utility in Equation 2 is continuous, unless the opponent places mass points.
The next result shows that as long as both lower bound utilities are strictly increasing, bidding the entire budget is the unique best response correspondence.
Lemma 4.
In any equilibrium, bidders with a budget w ∈ (w, m 1 ) bid their entire budget. For all w ∈ [w, m 1 ), the lower bound binds:
Assume the opponent bids his entire budget on (w, m 1 ). Any bid below one's budget loses so much probability in terms of winning that it does not justify the gain from the lower payment in case of a win. This guarantees that both bidders bidding their entire budget on this interval are mutually best responses. Lemma 4 establishes that this is the unique best response correspondence in any equilibrium.
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The following properties further narrow down the set of candidate equilibria.
Lemma 5. For i = j, the following holds in any equilibrium:
1. U i has at most one discontinuity. If it arises, it occurs at m j and
For a sketch of the argument, let bidder i have a strictly increasing utility U i on some interval above m 1 . Then, by Lemma 4, the lower bound binds, U i = U i . As U i is constant above m i , this rules out any strict increase in U 1 above m 1 for bidder 1, and in U 2 above m 2 for bidder 2. In the remaining case, bidder 2 has a strictly increasing utility U 2 on some interval within (m 1 , m 2 ). Then, bidder 2 bids his entire budget and F 2 = G 2 on this interval by Lemma 2. Bidder 1 then essentially faces a naive opponent in this interval. But bidder 12 Lemma 4 does not specify the bid of the lowest budget type w, while it determines his utility U i (w) = 0. As a budget w is a zero-probability event, b i (w) has no impact on G i . 1 would not want to bid above m 1 if his winning probability is the same as against a naive opponent; he could strictly do better by bidding m 1 . Thus, U 2 cannot be strictly increasing.
I show that discontinuities can only be due to mass points of the opponent. Mass points can occur only at m 1 (in bidder 1's strategy) and m 2 (in bidder 2's strategy). For a sketch of the argument, consider bidder 1 placing a mass point at some bid x > m 1 . For his opponent 2, a bid at the mass point yields lower utility than bidding infinitesimally above the mass point (due to a discrete jump in winning probability). However, this implies that bidder 2 with a budget above the mass point would never bid at or below the mass point. Furthermore, bidder 2 with a lower budget prefers to bid at the mass point, but cannot afford it. Hence, G 2 (x) = F 2 (x). The mass point placing bidder 1 essentially faces a naive opponent 2 at the mass point, and could do strictly better by bidding m 1 instead of x.
The next result determines a unique equilibrium utility as a function of the lower bound, using Lemma 2, 3, 4 and 5 to derive the complete characterization. 
Let (C2) hold. In any equilibrium, utilities are
A unique equilibrium utility can be recovered by computing the lower bound utilities U 1 and U 2 , the best response bids to a naive opponent m 1 and m 2 , and the difference v 1 − v 2 .
The utility levels of the wealthiest bidders with budget w are exactly v 1 − v 2 apart, as they both have the same supremum bid that wins with a probability of one. 13 In order to achieve this distance (v 1 − v 2 ) in the final utility levels, Lemma 5 allows the following variants: equilibrium utility U i can jump only at m j , but not increase continuously; a jump in U i at m j determines the utility of bidder j = i to U j (m j ) for an interval of higher budget levels. The above theorem shows that there is one unique way to allocate discontinuities such that the required utility difference U 1 (w) − U 2 (w) = v 1 − v 2 is satisfied. This involves exactly one discontinuity in bidder 2's utility in Case (C1), and two discontinuities in both bidders' utilities in Case (C2). Figure 2 illustrates the case m 1 = m 2 = w for the budget distributions in Example 1, with v 1 = 2 and v 2 = 3. The object is valuable enough and both bidders are likely to have a sufficiently high budget (i.e., Inequality 5 holds at every budget level) such that both lower bounds are strictly increasing within the entire budget domain. Case (C1) applies, as
The grey dashed lines are the lower bound utilities; they coincide with the equilibrium utility of bidder 1 (bidder 2), depicted by the blue (green) solid line. For all w < 1 = w, by Lemma 4, it holds that U i = U i . Bidder i with a budget w = 1 bids his entire budget 14 and derives a payoff 14 Any lower bid yields a strictly lower payoff as it corresponds to the payoff of a x-budget type.
. That is, for high enough budgets, the distance between the dashed gray lines is larger than the necessary distance between the solid green and blue lines in equilibrium. Thus, at least one utility has to lie strictly above the lower bound to achieve the necessary distance. Bidder 2's utility jumps at m 1 by such a magnitude to its final level such that the utility difference between the equilibrium amounts to v 1 − v 2 = 0.05. This rules out a discontinuity in bidder 1's utility. Otherwise, by Lemma 5, it would hold that U 2 (w ≥ m 2 ) = U 2 (m 2 ). Then, the distance to the highest utility of bidder 1 (which is bounded below by U 1 ) is strictly larger than the required v 1 − v 2 . Figure 4 shows another example for Case (C1) with U 1 < U 2 . Bidder 1 achieves exactly his lower bound utility for every budget level and bidder 2's utility U 2 jumps at m 1 above the lower bound U 2 to achieve the required distance (v 1 − v 2 ).
If
The lower bounds bind for every budget, and there are no discontinuities in the utilities: any mass point would distort the utility difference of the bidders away from the correct distance v 1 − v 2 .
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Figure 4: Case (C1) with
The utilities in Case (C2) in Theorem 1 are outlined in Figure 5 . In this case, the difference between the equilibrium utilities (
This cannot be achieved by a mass point of bidder 1 alone, as this would pin down the utility of bidder 1 to U 1 (w ≥ m 1 ) = U 1 (m 1 ) by Lemma 5. Bidder 2 has to place a mass point at bid m 2 to increase the difference in the equilibrium utilities to the required level.
In summary, if m 1 = w, Lemma 4 characterizes effectively the entire equilibrium utility and no mass points arise. If m 1 < w and Case (C1) holds, then bidder 1 places a mass point of such magnitude to elevate bidder 2's utility to its final level (v 1 − v 2 below his own utility). In Case (C2), bidders 1 and 2 place mass points at distinct bids to achieve the required distance v 1 − v 2 .
Equilibrium Bid Distributions
The next result shows the unique bid distributions and supremum bids in any equilibrium. (10) and the cumulative bid distributions satisfy
Theorem 2. In any equilibrium, the supremum bid of both bidders is
Bid distributions are unique in equilibrium, should it exist. They are invariant to the degree of asymmetry, as long as both lower bound utilities are strictly increasing. F 1 (w) and F 2 (w) can be identical, stochastically ordered (e.g., FOSD); bidding the entire budget is always the unique equilibrium candidate for budgets below m 1 . Above m 1 , bidders place bids on a non-empty interval to make their opponent indifferent. For example, in Case (C1), both bidders allocate their bidding mass on m 1 , b in such a way that any bid in this interval yields the same expected payoff to the opponent.
The equilibrium bid distributions might require mass points. This is summarized in the following result which immediately follows from the bid distributions in Theorem 2. 
Equilibrium Existence
The following result establishes existence of an equilibrium. I derive pure strategy weakly monotonic bidding functions that are feasible and optimal for the bidders.
Theorem 3. A pure strategy weakly monotonic equilibrium exists in the FPA.
The proof is by construction. If (C1) holds, the following weakly monotonic bidding functions constitute an equilibrium. (The bidding functions for (C2) are in the appendix.)
otherwise.
(12)
It is straightforward to show that these bidding functions b 1 and b 2 are feasible (i.e.,
and aggregate into the bid distributions G 1 and G 2 in Theorem 2. They are also optimal for the bidders. Bidder i with a budget in [w, m 1 ) would prefer to bid more than his budget, but cannot afford it; bidding below his budget yields a strictly lower payoff. On (m 1 , b], both bidders are bidding in such a way as to make their opponent indifferent between any bid in this interval. A mass point of bidder 1 at m 1 can be sustained in equilibrium. Bidder 2, who bids at or slightly below the mass point m 1 of his opponent, would want to increase his bid and get a jump in winning probability. However, bidder 2 cannot afford this upward deviation as he is already bidding his entire budget at and below the mass point.
Numerical Example. Consider the budget distributions in Example 1 and let v = 1.
and (C1) applies. The lower bound utilities are depicted in Figure 1 . The following pure strategy bidding functions constitute a weakly monotonic equilibrium:
and
otherwise. wins with a probability of one and yields the same payoff v − b = 1 4 to both bidders. Figure 7 shows the corresponding equilibrium utility of bidder 1 (blue line) and bidder 2 (green line). Utility is strictly increasing below m 1 = 1 2
. Bidder 1's mass point at m 1 raises bidder 2's utility to the same level as his own for budgets above . Bidder 2, with a budget at the mass point or slightly below, cannot deviate upwards as his budget constraint binds.
It is important to note that the constancy in equilibrium utility does not correspond to constancy in bids. The bidding function of bidder 2 makes bidder 1 indifferent between all bids in [ 
Discussion of the Results
Symmetric Bidders
In this section, I derive the equilibria for symmetric bidders. Let F (w) := F 1 (w) = F 2 (w) log-concave and v := v 1 = v 2 . Both bidders have the same lower bound utility U (w) := U 1 (w) = U 2 (w) and m := m 1 = m 2 , and (C1) therefore holds. If the opponent always bids his entire budget, both bidders prefer to bid m (or their full budget if they cannot afford m). Che and Gale (1996) solve for a symmetric and monotonic equilibrium. 16 They show that the lower bound always binds, U i (w) = U (w) for all w. I show that in any (possibly asymmetric and non-monotonic) equilibrium the following holds:
Any equilibrium has the following properties:
1. lower bounds utilities bind, i.e., for all w, U i (w) = U (w), 16 Che and Gale (1998) allow for n ≥ 2 bidders and do not impose log-concavity on the distribution F (w).
bid distributions are
This is a direct application of Theorems 1 and 2 for Case (C1), the proof is therefore omitted. By Corollary 1, no bidder can place a mass point. Figure 8 shows an example with v = 1 and F (w) = w for w ∈ [0, 1]. The equilibrium utility coincides for both bidders (blue line) and equals the lower bound utility, which is strictly increasing below m = 0.5. Che and Gale (1998) derive a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies (see Lemma 1 in Che and Gale (1998) ). For the case of two bidders with log-concave budget distributions, these strategies correspond with the bid functions in Equations 12 and 13 in this paper and aggregate into the bid distributions in Statement 2 of Corollary 2.
What other equilibria can exist within this framework? First, consider m = w. Then, by Lemma 4, bidders with w ∈ (w, w) bid their entire budget in any equilibrium. The bidder with the highest budget w bids his entire budget as any lower bid yields a strictly lower payoff. The bidder with the lowest budget w bids anything weakly lower than his budget. Hence, if m = w there exists a unique 17 equilibrium where bidders exhaust their budgets.
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Second, let m < w. For w < m, Lemma 4 also pins down the behavior in any equilibrium, Overall, lower bounds bind U i (w) = U (w) and the bid distributions G i (b) are unique in any equilibrium in this symmetric framework. If m < w, there might also exist a variety of asymmetric and mixed strategy bidding functions apart from the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that Che and Gale (1998) found.
Bidding Aggression
The monotonic pure strategy bidding functions in Section 3.4 allow a direct comparison in bidding behavior. For example, which bidder bids more aggressively if both have the same budget? When comparing bidding aggression in my model, there are two channels of interest. First, how does bidding aggression depend on the budget distribution? Second, how does bidding aggression depend on the valuation for the object?
As Lemma 4 shows, bidders with budget realization in [w, m 1 ) always bid their entire budget and are equally aggressive, irrespectively of any order statistic assumption on their budget distributions. If m 1 = w, under any order statistic, both bidders bid equally aggressive on the entire budget support in my framework.
In the next result, I assume that both bidders have the same valuation v for the object, and one bidder dominates his opponent in terms of RHR in the budget distribution. This allows me to elicit the differences in bidding aggression that are only due to differences in the budget distributions and not to heterogeneous valuations.
Proof. As bidder i RHR-dominates bidder j, it holds that i = 1 because m 1 ≤ m 2 . This is because the RHR-condition of the dominant bidder i is stricter than the RHR-condition of the dominated bidder. As RHR-dominance implies FOSD, it holds that U 1 (m 1 ) ≥ U 2 (m 2 ) and Case (C1). The highest bid is b = v − (v − m 1 )F 2 (m 1 ) and it can be easily checked that the bidding strategies in Equations 12 and 13 imply b 1 (w) ≤ b 2 (w) for all w ∈ [w, w]. (2000) target a related question for asymmetrically distributed valuations and bidders with unconstrained liquidity. They consider a variant of the RHRdominance on valuation distributions and show that if both bidders have the same valuation, the RHR-dominated bidder bids more aggressively. This is in line with the findings of this paper: the weaker bidder in the sense of RHR on budgets bids more aggressively.
Maskin and Riley
Proposition 1 compared bidding behavior for bidders with equal valuations and distinct bid distributions. Next, I compare bidders with identical budget distributions F (w) :=
Let v i > v j . Then, the RHR-condition is satisfied for bidder i whenever the RHRcondition is satisfied for bidder j, because
for all w ∈ (w, min{v j , w}). Therefore, it holds that j = 1 and v 2 > v 1 . An example is depicted in Figure 4 . Due to the higher valuation, the lower bound of bidder 2 is always above the lower bound of bidder 1.
Thus, Case (C1) applies. Using the pure monotonic bidding strategies in Equations 12 and 13, it immediately follows that b 2 (w)
]. For higher w, by assumption v 1 < v 2 , and it holds that
As before, bidders exhaust their entire budget below m 1 . For any higher budget, the bidder who values the object more bids more aggressively.
Bidder Welfare
When does a bidder have a higher utility level than his opponent at any budget realization?
The following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions. Proposition 3. The following statements are equivalent:
For all w, U
It is instructive to consider when the primitives of the model {v 1 , v 2 , F 1 , F 2 } translate into a higher lower bound utility U i at every budget level. If v 1 = v 2 , FOSD is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for U i ≥ U j . Let m 1 < w. Below m 1 , the object is sufficiently valuable and the opponent has a sufficiently high RHR to justify always exhausting their budget. In this case, the condition
This stresses that the precise shape of the budget distribution matters only for sufficiently low budget realizations for which Inequality 5 holds.
Below are the two special cases from Section 4.2 that are sufficient for one bidder to derive a higher utility than his opponent at every budget realization.
Let v i > v j , and
If a bidder has either a higher valuation or a higher budget distribution (in the sense of the RHR-dominance) than his opponent, he enjoys a higher lower bound utility: at every budget level, he is either more likely to win (RHR-dominance) or values the event of winning more (higher valuation) when bidding against a naive opponent.
A related question is how a change in the budget distribution impacts upon the utility of a bidder. Is a bidder better off with a higher (in terms of RHRs) budget distribution F k instead of F k ?
20 It turns out that the opposite is the case: both bidders are harmed by a stronger budget distribution. As in Equation 2, let U i (w) be the equilibrium utility of bidder i with F k , and U i (w) with F k . Let b be the supremum bid with distribution F k , and b with distribution F k .
20 My findings rely on both bidders knowing the budget distribution If, ceteris paribus, a bidder enjoys a stronger budget distribution, the bidding interval is stretched toward a higher supremum bid. The winning probability of any bid is lower for both bidders, and both bidders are worse off. The inequalities can be strict for both bidders, such that both bidders are strictly harmed by an increase in one's budget distribution at every budget level.
21 Overall, a more slack budget constraint in the sense of RHR-dominance might be strictly worse for a bidder: although the budget distribution places more mass on higher budget realizations (and, thus, possibly higher surplus), this effect might not fully compensate his higher bids and his lower winning probability at every budget level. The private binding budget constraints shield bidders from overbidding each other as in Bertrand competition, until at least one surplus is zero (Blume, 2003) . A less restrictive budget distribution strengthens a bidder's competitive position in comparison to his opponent, who reacts by bidding higher. A less restrictive budget distribution also brings a bidder closer to the unrestricted Bertrand game with zero payoff, as it relaxes his ability to pay up to his valuation.
Efficiency
If v 1 = v 2 , is the winner of the FPA the bidder with the highest value for the object? It is straightforward to see that this is not the case: a bidder with the lowest budget w always loses irrespective of his valuation.
A weaker requirement on efficiency is the following: does a bidder i who has a higher valuation v i > v j and a higher budget realization w i > w j win? In the following, I show that this weaker statement is also not true in general, but can hold under additional assumptions on the budget distributions F 1 and F 2 .
For example, let m 1 = w. Then, by the weakly monotonic strategies in Theorem 3 bidders bid their entire budget b i (w) = w. If a bidder with the highest value has a strictly higher budget than his opponent, he wins with probability one.
Next, let m 1 < w and consider bidders with equal budget distribution F := F 1 = F 2 who play the pure strategy weakly monotonic equilibrium with the bidding functions in Section 3.4. In Section 4.2, I established that a common budget distribution F and v i ≥ v j translates into i = 2 (i.e., v 2 ≥ v 1 ) and Case (C1). Proposition 2 establishes that b 2 (w) ≥ b 1 (w). Note that in Case (C1) only bidder 1 can place a mass point, while bidder 2 follows a strictly increasing pure strategy. Hence, for w 2 > w 1 , it holds that b 1 (w 1 ) ≤ b 2 (w 1 ) < b 2 (w 2 ): bidder 2 with the higher valuation wins the auction if he has a higher budget than his opponent.
The finding that the highest valuation bidder wins if he has a higher budget cannot be extended for arbitrary distributions. For example, let v 1 = 1.2, v 2 = 1 and the budget distributions stem from Example 1. A quick computation reveals that Case (C1) holds, as m 1 = 3/5, m 2 = 2/3, U 1 (m 1 ) = 9/25 and U 2 (m 2 ) = 4/27. Then, bidder 1 with a budget in [0.6, √ 0.4] bids at the mass point on 0.6 and loses against the lower value opponent who has a budget above m 1 . Hence, although v 1 > v 2 and w 1 > w 2 , bidder 1 loses with a probability of one for all w 1 ∈ (0.6, √ 0.4) if w 2 > m 1 . The stronger bidder bids less aggressively and admits a mass point. This is particularly inefficient if the stronger bidder has a lower valuation.
Extensions
Revenue Comparison
Revenue equivalence between standard auctions does not hold when bidders are budget constrained, as noted by Che and Gale (1996 , 1998 , 2006 .
22 Consider a framework where values are common knowledge and identical, i.e., v 1 = v 2 , and budgets are drawn from an identical distribution, F (w) := F 1 (w) = F 2 (w). Che and Gale (1996) proved that in this framework, the FPA dominates the second-price auction (SPA) with regards to revenue. I show that this revenue ranking does not hold under asymmetric budget distributions
the SPA can yield strictly higher revenue than the FPA for sufficiently asymmetric bidders. First, consider bidding strategies in a SPA without reservation values. Whenever both bidders have a budget above v, the auctioneer gets a payment of the full object value v. Whenever at least one bidder has a budget below the object value, the payoff of the seller is the lowest of the two budgets.
Let x := min{v, w} be the highest possible bid under any budget realization. The bidding strategies in Proposition 5 result in the following expected revenue for the designer in the SPA, Π SP A , where the last equality follows by applying integration by parts.
Now, consider the revenue in a FPA. The bidders share the same valuation v, the auctioneer's valuation is zero, and the object is always sold. Hence, the auction outcome is efficient and the total generated surplus is v. The revenue of the seller is the object value v minus the expected utilities of the bidders. That is,
The next proposition shows that the revenue ranking Π F P A ≥ Π SP A of the symmetric framework in Che and Gale (1996) does not extend to asymmetric budget distributions.
Proposition 6. Let v := v 1 = v 2 , and budgets be drawn with log-concave distribution functions F 1 (w) and F 2 (w). Then, the SPA can yield a strictly higher revenue than the FPA. Next, consider the FPA. The ex-ante utilities of the bidders can be computed from the equilibrium utilities for Case (C1) in Equations 12 and 13.
Plugging this into Equation 15 yield Π F P A ≈ 0.042. Thus, unlike in the symmetric setup with identical budget distributions, the SPA can yield a strictly higher revenue than the FPA, Π SP A > Π F P A .
In the literature on standard auctions without budget constraints, asymmetrically distributed valuations break revenue equivalence between standard auctions (Maskin and Riley, 2000) . A revenue ranking between standard auctions remains a subject of research, as no general revenue ranking can be established. For some particular distributions, revenue in a FPA is higher than in a SPA (see, e.g., Maskin and Riley, 2000) . This ranking does not always hold, as Gavious and Minchuk (2014) show that revenue in a SPA can be higher than that in a FPA under asymmetry.
With asymmetric budget constraints and common valuations, I showed that the revenue ranking Π F P A ≥ Π SP A no longer holds. It remains an open question as to under which conditions the FPA yields a higher revenue than the SPA in a framework with asymmetric budget constraints. Yet, finding a revenue ranking in this framework for particular asymmetric budget constraints might turn out more practical than for asymmetric valuations, as this paper provides a closed form expression for revenue and bidding behavior.
Information Disclosure
In the following, the auctioneer has the choice whether to disclose the identities of the bidders, e.g., by publishing a participation register. For this section, I assume that both bidders value the object equally, v :
Giving up the anonymity of the bidders is a relevant strategic decision for the designer. If the auctioneer discloses nothing, bidders are ex-ante symmetric in the sense that their distribution is drawn from the same prior distribution. If the auctioneer publishes a public participation register, bidders can look up annual budget reports and make inferences about the budget distributions of the opponents. I show that with ex-ante symmetric bidders, the auctioneer can never gain by disclosing noisy information about the budgets.
Let S be the finite set of budget type distributions, with each s ∈ S corresponding to a log-concave budget distribution function F s (w) on equal support [w, w] . The term type in this section refers to the type s of the budget distribution function, not the budget realization w. The budget distribution types s 1 and s 2 of bidders 1 and 2 are drawn independently and identically, with a probability p s > 0 for type s ∈ S, with s∈S p s = 1. Let the expected budget distribution F (w) := s∈S p s F s (w) also satisfy log-concavity.
Before the start of the auction, the auctioneer commits whether she wants to publish a participation register. Then, bidders arrive and budget types F i ∈ {F s } s∈S are drawn for i = {1, 2}. Bidders know their own type, but not the type of their opponent. The auctioneer observes both types and publicly announces the types, if she committed to do so. Then, budgets are drawn and observed only by the respective bidder. Finally, a FPA takes place.
Proposition 7. Revenue is weakly decreasing, if the auctioneer discloses budget-type information about ex-ante symmetric bidders.
The total surplus generated by the auction equals v, and consists of the auctioneer's revenue and the bidders' expected utilities. Hence, a higher expected utility for the bidders corresponds to a lower payoff for the auctioneer. Under no disclosure (of budget types s 1 and s 2 ), the bidders have identical expectations about their opponent's budget distribution. In this symmetric case, the lower bound on the equilibrium utility binds for every budget w. 23 Under disclosure of budget types, the lower bound utility is weakly higher, as bidders can condition their best response bid upon their opponent's budget type. Furthermore, as I showed in Theorem 1, under asymmetry, a bidder can achieve an equilibrium utility strictly above his lower bound utility. Thus, under information disclosure, bidders are better off than under no disclosure, which leaves a smaller share of the total surplus for the auctioneer. In many auction houses, such as Sotheby's, bidding is anonymous: bidders take part in an auction, before knowing who their opponents will be. Moreover, during the auction, bidders remain anonymous by placing bids via phone or by raising one's auction paddle. For narrow markets such as the telecommunications sector, while usually participants are announced before the start of the auction, this in fact might not constitute a strategic decision of the auction designer, but rather a peculiarity of the respective market: anonymity might not be implementable in such a narrow market with few constantly interacting participants.
In this section, I analyzed a very specific information disclosure rule: the auctioneer has the choice as to whether she wants bidders to remain symmetric, or reveal noisy information about the budget distributions. However, this noisy information is exogenously given and the auctioneer cannot modify its precision or send private and potentially correlated signals. Future research could endogenize the information structure further by allowing the auctioneer to design the signal precision, as in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) , in line with the expanding literature on Bayesian persuasion (see, e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) . Proposition 7 still holds, if the type space S is not given, but designed by the auctioneer. However, any type in S has to satisfy log-concavity and have a strictly positive density on the same support as all other types: [w, w] . Enabling the designer to create types with different support (e.g., by allowing a monotone partition 24 into a low-budget and a high-budget interval) might yield further insights about the optimal information disclosure policy.
All-Pay Auction
In this section, I apply my results to the all-pay auction. Similar to the FPA, the lower bound of bidder i with budget w, who faces a naive j-opponent bidding his entire budget, is
For the FPA, Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that the lower bound utility U i is strictly increasing in a bid below some m i > w, and constant thereafter. For the all-pay auction, Assumption 1 is not sufficient to guarantee these properties of the lower bound utility U 
Theorem 4. Let Assumption 2 hold. The all-pay auction has an equilibrium.
In any equilibrium, the supremum bid for both bidders is
In any equilibrium, equilibrium utilities are unique and the bid distributions satisfy
Note that bidder 1 bids with a uniform distribution above m a 1 , and bidder 2 also bids uniformly on (m The uniqueness result of equilibrium utility and bid distributions in the all-pay auction holds if the lower bound is strictly increasing for sufficiently low budget levels, and constant thereafter. In the FPA, the log-concavity of the budget distributions is sufficient to guarantee that the lower bound utility has these properties. In the all-pay auction, the log-concavity of the budget distributions does not imply this shape of the lower bound, and imposing Assumption 2 is with loss of generality.
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Concluding Remarks
In this work, I have derived equilibrium utilities and bid distributions for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions, who compete for one object in a FPA. I allow for any asymmetry in the budget distributions, as long as they satisfy log-concavity and common full support. Che and Gale (1996) showed that in a symmetric equilibrium with identically distributed budgets, the equilibrium utilities of the bidders equal a lower bound on utility. I have 25 This has been noted in the context of all-pay auctions with complete information and no budget constraints. See, e.g., Amann and Leininger (1996) ; Baye et al. (1996) .
26 For arbitrary budget distributions F 1 and F 2 , U a i can be zero for every budget level or have multiple flat intervals. Hence, an equilibrium might involve multiple mass points where the lower bound alternates between flat intervals and increasing intervals. While some results and methods from this paper are applicable to such a scenario, a closed-form characterization and the uniqueness of an equilibrium utility remains an open questions.
extended the framework of Che and Gale (1996) in two directions: I allow for different valuations for the object, and introduce asymmetric budget constraints. In this framework, the lower bound does not necessarily bind. However, the equilibrium utilities in a FPA can still be recovered from the lower bound. I also applied this technique to the all-pay auction to derive the unique equilibrium shape and bid distributions.
My approach unravels the equilibrium via eliminating candidate equilibria shapes. As long as both RHR are sufficiently high, equilibrium strategies are invariant to the degree of asymmetry and the lower bounds bind. If a RHR drops below a threshold, mass points can arise and bidders achieve a utility strictly above their lower bound. I show that there remains only one potential shape for the equilibrium utility and bid distributions after this elimination, and construct weakly monotonic bidding strategies to establish existence.
There exists a parallel between my framework and bidders with asymmetrically distributed valuations with no budget constraints. If bidders are asymmetric in the valuation dimension and have no budget constraints, bidding behavior in a FPA beyond a differential equation is complicated to derive without additional assumptions 27 (see, e.g., Maskin and Riley, 2000) . If bidders have asymmetric budget distributions and common knowledge valuations, the auction game is solvable in closed-form under weak assumptions (log-concavity and full common support) as my results show. I impose no stochastic order or particular distribution on the budget distributions. Maskin and Riley (2000) show that a weaker bidder bids more aggressively under the additional assumption of RHR-dominance on valuations if there are no budget constraints. In my model, under RHR-dominance on budget distributions, the weaker bidder with respect to the budget also bids more aggressively than his stronger opponent. Mass points can be part of an equilibrium because budget constraints are hard, and bidders cannot outbid their budget. Due to the tie-breaking rule, bidding below a mass point of the opponent yields a strictly lower utility than bidding exactly at a mass point. Furthermore, bidding at a mass point of the opponent yields strictly lower utility than bidding above a mass point. The incentives to increase one's budget are particularly strong around mass points. For example, if a bidder with a budget slightly below a mass point could borrow to increase his budget, he could derive a discrete jump in surplus by bidding at the mass point. This might influence the initial budget distribution if the budget is determined endogenously before the start of the auction.
28 Finding an equilibrium with asymmetric budget distributions and allowing bidders to borrow (see, e.g., Zheng, 2001 , for soft budgets with a borrowing market) might be an interesting question for future research.
A Appendix
Proof 
. This is positive whenever the following inequality (Inequality 5) is satisfied.
The RHR on the left-hand side is decreasing in b by Assumption 1; the right-hand side is strictly increasing in b for b < v i . If there exists an m i such that
, it is unique. Then, for all w < m i , the RHR inequality is strict and the lower bound is strictly increasing. For w > m i , the inequality does not hold and the lower bound is constant at (v i − m i )F j (m i ). Any bid b > m i yields a strictly lower expected utility than bidding m i .
The above inequality might also hold strictly for all w. In this case, m i = w as the opponent never bids above w. The lower bound strictly increases over the entire domain.
Proof of Lemma 2. By contradiction, let bidder i with a budgetw ∈ (w , w ) place a bid b <w below his budget. The expected utility of budget levelw is then
Take a bidder i with a lower budget (w − ) ∈ (w , w ) who can afford the bidb, i.e., choose > 0 such thatb ≤w − . Such a bidder can mimic thew-budget type: bidb and obtain the same utility as in Equation 18. This contradicts U i (w) > U i (w − ) if U i is strictly increasing on (w , w ). Hence, b i (w) = w for w ∈ (w , w ).
A bidder i with a budget w ≤ w cannot afford a bid above w ; bidder i with a budget above w bids at least w as any lower bid yields lower payoff as U i is strictly increasing on (w , w ). Hence, G i (w) = F i (w) for w ∈ (w , w ).
Proof of Lemma 3. By contradiction, let U i strictly increase on (w , w ) and there exists a budget level w ∈ (w , w ) such that U i (w ) > U i (w ) .
As U i is strictly increasing, by Lemma 2 this implies that bidder i with budget realization in (w , w ) bids his entire budget b i (w) = w and
Next, I show that the bidding distribution function G j of bidder j does not place sufficient probability on w to elevate bidder i's utility strictly above the lower bound U i (w ). . In this interval, it is equivalent to bidding against a naive opponent. Biddingb yields a utility strictly below the lower bound, as bidder j could be strictly better off by bidding m j instead ofb:
Hence, bidder j never bids within the interval (m j , w ). However, in this case, U i cannot be strictly increasing on w ∈ (m j , w ), leading to a contradiction.
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Case 2: m j ≥ w . The utility of bidder j is strictly increasing in a bid on this interval, as it coincides with the lower bound U j (w) = (v j − w)F i (w), which is strictly increasing below m j . Hence, if bidding in this interval, bidder j would choose the highest feasible bid for him, b j (w) = w.
Either bidder j with budget w ∈ (w , w ) bids b j (w) = w, or he places another feasible bid b ≤ w if it yields a strictly higher utility than the lower bound utility at w. However, if such a b exists, bidder j with a budget in (w , w) never places a bid in this interval. This contradicts that U i is strictly increasing on (w a, w). If such a b does not exist, it holds that G j (w) = F j (w) for all w ∈ (w , w ). However, this is not sufficient to elevate the utility of bidder i with budget w above the lower bound:
which yields a contradiction.
29 Slightly decreasing bidder i's bid yields the same positive winning probability for a lower payment.
Proof of Lemma 4. First, I establish that for the lowest possible budget w it always holds that the lower bound binds: U i (w) = U i (w). Assume by contradiction that for some i ∈ {1, 2}, it holds that U i (w) = 0 < U i (w). Because bidder i with any budget realization has a strictly positive utility, 30 any bid wins with a strictly positive probability. Let a bid b i be the infimum bid in the entire bidding support of the i-bidder with any budget realization. Note that b i ≤ w. For b i to win with positive probability, this requires bidder j to (i) place a mass point at b i , or (ii) bid with a strictly positive probability below b i . The latter scenario (ii) is impossible in equilibrium, as it requires some bidder j with a budget above w to bid below b i . Each such bid of j strictly below b i results in an expected utility of zero (it never wins), which is below the lower bound U j and, thus, impossible. The former scenario (i) (a mass point at b i ) cannot be part of an equilibrium, because bidder i would always want to slightly outbid the mass point if feasible to gain a discrete jump in winning probability. This implies that
The positive mass of the j-bidders who bid at the mass point derive zero utility, which is strictly below the lower bound U j for some of them. This yields a contradiction, and hence, U i (w) = U i (w) = 0. Next, I prove the theorem by contradiction for w ∈ (w, m 1 ). Assume U i (w) > U i (w) for some w ∈ (w, m 1 ). Both U i (w) for i ∈ {1, 2} are strictly increasing on [w, m 1 ). Let x > w be the budget within (w, m 1 ), for which the strictly monotonic lower bound U i (.) catches up and reaches the same value, i.e., U i (w) = U i (x). If such x does not exists, take m 1 . That is, equilibrium utility is strictly above the lower bound U i > U i , on at least the non-empty interval [w, x) .
As U i is a monotonic function, it can have only countable jump discontinuities on (w, x). Hence, U i has to be either (i) continuous and strictly increasing, or (ii) constant on some subinterval within [w, x) . A strict increase in (i) is ruled out by Lemma 3: U i cannot be both strictly increasing and strictly above the lower bound U i . I show in the following that the latter yields a contradiction as well, if both U i (w) are strictly increasing.
Let U i (w) = U > U i (w) be constant on some intervals within (w, x). Define z i = inf {w :
U i (w) = U } as the lowest budget, above which bidder i achieves a payoff equal to U . First, let z i = w. This is ruled out by the first paragraph of this proof that established that
Second, let z i > w. U i is a monotonic function, and a continuous strict increase on an open interval is ruled out by Lemma 3. Hence, bidder j has a mass point at z i , as by Lemma 3 any increase above the lower bound in the interior is due to a mass point. This implies that z i is indeed the infimum, not the minimum. Bidder i-types with a budget above z i always bid above z i to extract the additional winning probability from avoiding the tie-breaking rule; therefore, F i (z i ) = G i (z i ). However, this yields a contradiction for the utility of bidder j: a mass point of j at z i implies that there is a continuum of bidder j with a budget above z i who can at most achieve (v j − z i )F j (z i ) = U j (z i ); otherwise they would have a profitable deviation by bidding above z i instead of sticking to the mass point. Bidding z i yields an expected payoff of
, which equals the lower bound U j (z i ). Yet, the lower bound is strictly increasing around z i : if bidder j-types had a constant utility to establish the mass point for higher budget realizations than z i , their utility would fall strictly below the lower bound on utility, which is impossible.
The previous argument established that U i (w) = U i (w) below m 1 . The second part of the Lemma follows from Lemma 3: as U i (w) is strictly increasing below m 1 , all bidders bid their entire budget on (w, m 1 ). Next, consider the second statement of the lemma. A mass point at b = w is infeasible, as only bidders with budget realization w (which is a zero probability event) can afford the highest bid. Now, assume b < w. Let bidder i have a mass point at b < min(v 1 , v 2 ). Then, bidder j with a budget above b has a profitable deviation: slightly outbidding his supremum bid b. Bidding b + for some > 0 sufficiently small yields a jump in winning probability, by avoiding the tie-breaking at b for an infinitesimally lower payment. 
Proof of Lemma
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist
α ≥ m 1 , and β < b. Opponent j = i also places zero bidding mass on (α, β), as lowering j's bid in this range yields a strictly lower payment for the same winning probability. Let
There cannot be a mass point at β. If both bidders place a mass point at β, both have a strictly profitable deviation to slightly outbid the mass point. If only one bidder places a mass point at β, he has a strictly profitable deviation to decrease his bid; without an atom of his opponent at β, a decrease in the bid slightly below β implies a strictly lower payment for the same winning probability. Hence, Pr(b i = β) = Pr(b j = β) = 0. Furthermore, by the properties of a cumulative distribution function, it holds that lim b β Pr(
there is no mass point at a), which is strictly higher. Hence, a positive bidder mass bidding sufficiently close to β could do strictly better by shading their bid to α, and pay strictly less for a negligible loss in winning probability. As a downward deviation is feasible with budget constraints, this is a contradiction.
Assume by contradiction that there exist w and w with w < w such that U i (w ) < U i (w ) in one of the three intervals in Statement 2 in Lemma 5. U i is a monotonic function. It is only possible to have U i (w ) < U i (w ) if at least one of the following statements hold: First, I show that (a) cannot hold in any equilibrium. Let U i be strictly and continuously increasing on some (a, b) ⊆ (w , w ).
Let i = 1. By Lemma 2, U 1 = U 1 on (a, b). However, U 1 is constant above m 1 , which yields a contradiction. Next, let i = 2. If (w , w ) ⊂ (m 2 , w], the same argument applies: U 2 = U 2 on (a, b). However, U 2 is constant above m 2 , yielding a contradiction. If  (w , w ) ⊂ (m 1 , m 2 ) , by Lemma 2, bidder 2 bids with G 2 = F 2 on (a, b) . This implies that bidder 1 would not want to place any bid in the interval (a, b): a bid x would yield utility (v 1 − x)F 2 (x), which is strictly smaller than the surplus from bidding m 1 < a, which is at least equal to (v 1 − m 1 )F 2 (m 1 ). As bidder 1 never places a bid in (a, b), bidder 2 (who places a bid in this interval) has a strictly profitable deviation: decrease one's bid, win with the same (strictly positive) winning probability, but pay less in case of a win.
Second, I show that (b) is also not possible in equilibrium. Let the jump discontinuity occur at x ∈ [w , w ]. A jump discontinuity in U i at x can only occur if G j contains an atom at which a bidder i with budget x is bidding.
33 This follows from Lemma A.2, as without
and also the maximum of this in Equation  18 ), which is a continuous function. Then, a bid slightly above the atom yields a strictly higher utility to bidder i than bidding at the mass point. This is because by infinitesimally outbidding the mass point, bidder i gets a discrete jump in winning probability for a marginally higher payment, and the mass point lies strictly below min{v 1 , v 2 } by Lemma A.1. Any bidder i with a budget strictly above x would not bid at the mass point, but slightly above x or even higher. Therefore, F i (x) = G i (x). However, bidder j then placing the mass point at x has a strictly profitable deviation: bidding m j instead of the mass point and getting a payoff of at least (v j − m j )F i (m i ). This is strictly larger than the payoff from bidding at the mass point,
As (a) or (b) lead to a contradiction, this establishes Statement 2 of the lemma. Furthermore, from the last paragraph, any discontinuity of U i at x > m j yields a strictly profitable deviation for bidder j. Any discontinuity of U i below m j is ruled out by Lemma 4. This leaves one potential discontinuity at m j , proving Statement 1 of the lemma.
A discontinuity in U j at m i is due to a mass point of bidder i at m i , due to Lemma A.2. If bidder i places an atom at m i , bidder j's utility has a jump discontinuity at m i : bidder j has a strictly higher surplus from bidding slightly above the mass point than his surplus from bidding exactly at the mass point, because he can avoid the tie-breaking rule. Therefore, bidder j prefers to bid above m i whenever he can afford it, and F j (m i ) = G j (m i ). Hence, bidder i's utility from bidding at the atom is
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let m 1 = w, and, thus, m 2 = w. Then, Lemma 4 pins down the utilities for w < w and the supremum bid b = w. As by Lemma A.1 there is no mass point at b, it also holds that U i (w) = U i (w) = (v i − b) .
Next, assume m 1 < w and let (m 1 , m 2 ) be non-empty. Then, the equilibrium utility of bidder 2 is discontinuous at m 1 and requires a mass point of bidder 1. This is because by Lemma 5, U 2 (w) is constant for budget realizations w ∈ (m 1 , w]. Note that U 2 (w) ≥ U 2 (m 2 ) for w ∈ (m 1 , w], with U 2 (m 2 ) being the highest value for the lower bound, which the equilibrium utility cannot undercut. Moreover, U 2 (m 2 ) > U 2 (m 1 ) strictly, as the lower bound is strictly increasing below m 2 due to the log-concavity assumption. By Theorem 4, the lower bound binds, U 2 (w) = U 2 (w) for w ∈ [w, m 1 ). Approaching the utility of bidder 2 from both sides at m 1 shows the discontinuity and, therefore, a mass point of bidder 1:
. Bidder 1 has to have a mass point at m 1 in his bid distribution function to enable this jump in the expected utility of bidder 2 to achieve a utility of at least the lower bound.
When does bidder 2 place a mass point at m 2 ? Both bidders share the same supremum bid. The payoff from bidding b is v i − b, as it wins with a probability of one, as there is no mass point at it.
34 As the payoff is non-decreasing in the bid, the highest budget type w has the same utility as bidding at the supremum. Hence, the difference in surplus of the highest budget types always satisfies
If bidder 2 does not place a mass point, bidder 1's utility is constant at U 1 (w) = U 1 (m 1 ) by Lemma 5. Furthermore, by Lemma 5, U 1 is constant on (m 1 , m 2 ) and (m 2 , w]. It is equal to the lower bound on (m 1 , m 2 ) as bidder 1 places a mass point at m 1 . Thus, unless there is a jump discontinuity at m 2 , bidder 1's utility is equal to his lower bound for all w.
Let (C1) holds, i.e., U 1 (m 1 ) − U 2 (m 2 ) ≥ v 1 − v 2 . If bidder 2 were to place a mass point, it would hold that U 1 (w) > U 1 (m 1 ) and U 2 (w) = U 2 (m 2 ). However, then U 1 (w) − U 2 (w) =
, which is a contradiction.
As bidder 2 does not place a mass point, it holds that U 1 (w) = U 1 (m 1 ) and U 2 =: U 2 (w > m 1 ) being constant. Thus,
This pins down the utility level for bidder 2 with a budget above m 1 . Due to the equal tie-breaking rule, bidder 2's utility at m 2 is exactly the average of the left and right hand side limit of the utility. We have U 1 (w) = U 1 (w) for all w, and the expression for U 2 in the theorem follows.
Let (C2) holds, i.e., U 1 (m 1 ) − U 2 (m 2 ) < v 1 − v 2 . If bidder 2 does not place a mass point, it holds that U 1 (w) = U 1 (m 1 ) and U 2 (w) ≥ U 2 (m 2 ). In this case,
, yielding again a contradiction. Hence, bidder 2 places a mass point at m 2 . Note that U 2 is constant on (m 1 , m 2 ) and U 2 (m 2 ) = U 2 (m 2 ). Furthermore, U 2 (w) = U 2 (m 2 ) and the constant utility of bidder 1 has to satisfy U 1 (w) − U 2 (m 2 ) = v 1 − v 2 . This pins down a unique equilibrium utility U 1 and U 2 .
Finally, consider m 1 = m 2 < w. By Footnote 8, bidders are labeled such that
Then, by the same arguments as above, bidder 1 places a mass point at m 1 which leads to a jump discontinuity in U 2 at m 1 . This pins down the utility of bidder 1 to U 2 = U 2 for all w ≥ m 1 , and raises the equilibrium utility of bidder 2 via a jump discontinuity to the required level such that U 2 (w > m 2 ) =
Then, no mass point can be sustained, as it would distort utilities away from their final levels. Plugging in the expression for the lower bounds completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma A.1, there is no mass point at the highest bid. For simplicity, let b also be the maximum bid. 35 A bid at the maximum b yields payoff v i − b, as it wins with certainty. As surplus has to be weakly increasing in the bid, the payoff from the highest bid corresponds to the payoff of the highest budget type,
Solving for b in both cases yields the expression for the supremum bid in the theorem. Next, I derive the bid distributions G 1 and G 2 . Let m 1 = w. Then, the bid distributions in the theorem follow from Lemma 4. For the following, assume that m 1 < w. Below m 1 , bid distributions coincide with the budget distributions G i = F i , by Lemma 4. By Lemma A.2 and 5, the bidding support coincides for both bidders and has no empty intervals in (w, b) .
The following identifies where mass points can occur. Let bidder j place a mass point at x ∈ (m 1 , b). By Lemma A.2 there is a continuum of bidder i bidding in the left-or right-neighborhood of x. Due to a discrete jump in winning probability at and above x, these bidders i bidding below the mass point have a strictly lower utility than at the mass point, which in turn enjoy a lower utility than those bidding slightly above the mass point. To rule out profitable deviations, this is only possible if 
Solving for G 2 (b) yields the bid distribution G 2 above m 1 in Theorem 2 that has to be satisfied in any equilibrium.
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Similarly, bidder 1 cannot place a mass point above m 1 , as this would contradict that U 2 is constant above m 1 (which is required by Theorem 1). Any bid on (m 1 , b) yields the same utility
Solving for G 1 (b) yields the result for Case (C1).
Case (C2):
Bidder 1 has no mass point above m 1 , as this would contradict U 2 (w > m 1 ) = U 2 (m 2 ). Solving the following expression for G 1 yields the result for bidder 1:
By the same argument, due to the constancy of the equilibrium utility indifference condition for these bids
Bidder 1, with a budget above m 2 , bids above m 2 , and their indifference condition satisfies
Solving both indifference conditions for G 2 (b) yields the bid distribution in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is by construction. If (C1) holds, let the bidding functions be as in Equations 12 and 13. If (C2) holds, let the bidding functions of bidder 1 be Equation 12 and the bidding function of bidder 2 be
First, I show that these bidding functions aggregate into the bid distributions 
. Solving this expression for G 2 (b) yields the bid distribution in Theorem 2. The same approach applied to bidder 1 in Equation 12 and to bidder 2 in Equation 20 for (C2) yields the required bid distributions.
Next, I show the feasibility of the bidding functions, i.e., for all w and i it holds that
For any bid equal to or below m 1 , feasibility is trivially satisfied. It is left to show that 1.
, which holds by Lemma 1. Rewrite Inequality 2 as (v i − w)F j (w) ≤ v i − b. This is true since for w ≥ m i , it holds that
For Inequality 3, applying F 2 to both sides yields
. This holds by Lemma 1, hence, establishing feasibility.
Finally, I show optimality. Let w < m 1 . Any bid b < w yields strictly lower utility than Proof of Proposition 3. Proof of 2. ⇒ 1. For w < m 1 , by Lemma 3, it holds that U i (w) =
. For w ≥ m 1 the following case distinction establishes the result, utilizing the equilibrium utility in Corollary 1. Let Case (C1) in Corollary 1 hold. If U 1 (w) ≥ U 2 (w), and v 1 ≥ v 2 , then
If U 2 (w) ≥ U 1 (w) and v 2 ≥ v 1 in Case (C1), then
Next, consider Case (C2). Let U 1 (w) ≥ U 2 (w), and
Finally, let U 2 (w) ≥ U 1 (w), and v 2 ≥ v 1 . For w > m 1 , it holds that
At m 1 , it holds that U 1 (m 1 ) = U 1 (m 1 ) ≤ U 2 (m 1 ) ≤ U 2 (m 1 ), which establishes 2. ⇒ 1.
Proof of 1. ⇒ 2. First, I show that v i ≥ v j is a necessary condition for U i ≥ U j at every budget level. Let by contradiction v i < v j and U i ≥ U j for all w. The supremum bid b corresponds to the highest utility level and wins with probability one.
It is left to show that
Assume by contradiction that there exists aw such that U i (w) ≥ U j (w), and for all w, it holds that U i ≥ U j . Ifw < m 1 , there is an immediate contradiction by Lemma 3, as the lower bound and the equilibrium utility coincide. Hence, it holds that U i ≥ U j for all w < m 1 .
Next, considerw ≥ m 1 . First, let i = 2 such that for all w, U 2 ≥ U 1 . U 1 is constant above m 1 , and hence U 1 (m 1 ) = U 1 (w). As established above, U 2 (w) ≥ U 1 (w) for w < m 1 . By continuity of U i and U j , it also holds that U 2 (m 1 ) ≥ U 1 (m 1 ). Then, it has to hold that
Therefore, a budget level ofw such that U 2 (w) < U 1 (w) cannot exist by the properties of the lower bound, yielding the contradiction.
Second, let i = 1 such that for all w, U 1 ≥ U 2 . Let there exist aw ≥ m 1 such that U 1 (w) < U 2 (w). Then, it holds that U 1 (m 1 ) = U 1 (w) and U 2 (m 2 ) ≥ U 2 (w). Furthermore, as established above, v 1 ≥ v 2 . Thus, Case (C2) in Corollary 1 holds. In this case, take any w ∈ (m 1 , m 2 ) 38 . By Corollary 1, this yields a contradiction to U 1 ≥ U 2 :
Proof of Proposition 4. Let k = 2, that is, F 2 ≥ RHR F 2 . The proof for k = 1 with F 1 ≥ RHR F 1 works accordingly and is therefore omitted.
38 Note that the interval (m 1 , m 2 ) is nonempty if such aw exists and it holds that U 1 ≥ U 2 for w > m 1
For bidder 2, m 2 and U 2 are not affected by his own budget distribution. For bidder 1, let m 1 = arg max{(v 1 − b)F 2 (b)} and m 1 = arg max{(v 1 − b)F 2 (b)}. Note that due to RHRdominance, it holds that m 1 ≤ m 1 . Furthermore, due to FOSD it holds that U 1 (w) ≥ U 1 (w) for all w, and as the lower bound is non-decreasing it also holds that U 1 (m 1 ) ≥ U 1 (m 1 ).
If m 1 > m 2 , the labels of the bidders as bidder 1 and 2 are reversed with F 2 versus F 2 .
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Let i ∈ {1, 2} refer to the bidder identities with F 2 , andĩ ∈ {1,2} with F 2 . 
Proof
where the last inequality follows from (C1) under F 2 . Second, let the identities of the bidders change (that is, such that1 = 2 and2 = 1) because m 1 ≤ m 2 < m 1 . If with both budget distributions (C1) applies, then v 2 = v1 and 
Proof of G i being FOSD over G i : First, let the labels of the bidders be the same with both distributions,1 = 1 and2 = 2.
The bid distribution of bidder 1 with F 2 is in Equation 11 in Theorem 4. With F 2 , it
The bid distribution of bidder 2 with F 2 is again in Equation 11 in Theorem 4. Substituting F 2 for F 2 , m 1 for m 1 , and b for b, yields the new bid distribution under F 2 . As before, it is apparent that G 2 ≤ G 2 for bids below m 1 or above m 2 . For b ∈ [m 1 , m 1 ) and
Finally, let the labels of the bidders change such that1 = 2 and2 = 1. Consider bidder 39 See the normalization in Section 3.1. 40 It cant be the other way as U 1 (m 1 ) ≥ U 1 (m 1 ). 41 Note that it is impossible to have (C2) with F 2 and (C1) with F 2 .
1. His bid distribution with F 2 and F 2 can be recovered from Equation 11. With F 2 , his bid distribution is
Below m 1 and above m 1 , it immediately holds that
. This establishes the inequality for the entire interval, and G 1 ≤ G 1 . For bidder 2, the same approach establishes that G 2 ≤ G 2 when identities change.
Note that the utility at every budget level is also lower with F 2 than with F 2 . Without loss, consider the utility of bidder 1 with budget w in Equation 18. The opponent bids either with G 2 or G 2 . That is, any bid yields a weakly lower winning probability with G 2 than with G 2 , while the surplus of a win (v 1 − b) remains the same. the lower bound at a budget w does not depend on a bidder's own budget type s i . This is because his own budget distribution F s i has no impact on his best response bids given w and the bidding behavior of the opponent, as he bids after learning w. Finally, I establish that at every w for any budget type s i , equilibrium utility in the no-disclosure regime is weakly lower than in the disclosure regime. 
The revenue of the designer is the total surplus generated, v, minus the expected utilities of both bidders (see Equation 15). Taking expectations over bidder i's budget types s i and budget realizations w, the ex-ante expected utility of a bidder under no disclosure is lower than under the disclosure regime. Hence, a lower expected utility for the bidders in the no-disclosure regime corresponds to a higher revenue for the seller.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is analogous to the steps for the FPA. Let b a be the supremum bid in the all-pay auction, and define the two cases as for the FPA:
Under Assumption 2, the four core Lemmas 2, 3, 4 and 5 also hold for the all-pay auction, after substituting U A.2 in the Appendix, and Theorem 1 also hold after substituting the notation. This can be checked using exactly the same steps of the proofs as for the FPA (therefore, I omit the proofs). The only difference is to use U a i instead of U i , and to apply the payment rule of the all-pay auction (always forgo one's bid) instead of that for the FPA (pay only if win). Hereby, the assumption w = 0 guarantees that the utility of bidding the lowest budget w = 0 is zero. As Theorem 1 holds for the all-pay auction, equilibrium utilities are uniquely determined. 
As in the proof for the FPA, it can be easily checked that these bidding functions satisfy the bid distributions in Theorem 4, and lead to the equilibrium utilities in Theorem 1 for the all-pay auction.
Optimality is satisfied: bidders with budget strictly below m a 1 (and bidder 2 with budget m a 1 ) prefer to bid higher, but cannot afford it. If (C1) holds, all the remaining budget types have no strictly profitable deviation, as any bid yields the same or lower utility. If (C2) holds, all the remaining bidder 2 have the same equilibrium utility and can only do worse by bidding differently. The remaining bidder 1 types have no profitable deviation: note that b a 1 (m 2 ) = m 2 . Thus, bidders with a budget below or at m 2 cannot afford the strictly profitable deviation to bid above m 2 , while bidders with a budget above m 2 achieve the highest possible utility with bids above m 2 and have no strictly profitable deviation. 
where the last inequality holds by Assumption 2.
